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7 I.R.C. § 453(e)(i), (3).
8 See Harl, n. 1 supra, § 48.03[6]; Harl, Agricultural Law
Manual § 6.03[1][e] .
9 I.R.C. § 453(e)(4).
10 E.g., Trivett v. Comm’r, 611 F.2d 655 (6th Cir. 1979),
aff'g, 36 T.C.M. 675; Pozzi v. Comm’r, 49 T.C. 119
(1967).
11 Oden v. Comm’r, 56 T.C. 569 (1971).
12 See Rev. Rul. 71-352, 1971-2 C.B. 221.
13 Harris v. Commissioner, 477 F.2d 812 (4th Cir. 1973).
14 Rev. Rul. 77-294, 1977-2 C.B. 173.
15 Reed v. Comm’r, 83-2 U.S.T.C. ¶ 9728 (1st Cir. 1983),
rev'g, T.C. Memo. 1982-734.
16 See Lustgarten v. Comm’r, 639 F.2d 1208 (5th Cir.
1981) (sale to son where son was taxpayer's agent
constituted constructive receipt); Wrenn v. Comm’r, 67
T.C. 576 (1976) (sale of property in installment sale
transaction to spouse who in turn sold property to third
party failed to defer recognition of gain).
17 Vaughn v. Comm’r, 87 T.C. 164, reconsidering 81 T.C.
893 (1983) (sale to son who was not personally liable on
obligation did not result in constructive receipt as to
amount in escrow from resale of property).
18 I.R.C. § 453(e)(1), (3).
19 I.R.C. § 453(e)(6)(B). See Ltr. Rul. 8848054, Sept. 7,
1988 (substitution of new property as security for
isntallment obligation secured by property sold under
threat of condemnation not disposition of installment
obligation).
20 I.R.C. § 453(e)(6)(C).
21 I.R.C. § 453(e)(7).
22 I.R.C. § 453(e)(6)(A).
23 I.R.C. § 453(f)(1), 267(b),(c)(4).
24 I.R.C. § 453(f)(1).
25 Id. See Ltr. Rul. 8829002, March 18, 1988 (partner
owning 40 percent of partnership which received in
liquidation of corporation installment obligation for
property purchased by partner from corporation was not
related to partner's father who was 60 percent partner;
transfer of installment obligation owned by 40 percent
shareholder to partnership in liquidation of corporation
not disposition of installment obligation causing
recognition of all gain where shareholder became 40
percent partner and transfer not sham or made for
principal purpose of avoiding income tax).
CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
    GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03.*
EXEMPTIONS
COWS. The debtor had granted a non-possessory, non-
purchase money security interest in five Hereford cows and
five calves. The debtor claimed the ten animals as exempt
milk cows under Okla. Stat. tit. 31, § 1(A)(10).  The debtor
testified that the cows were raised as beef cattle and that the
cows were milked only for the purposes of feeding new
calves. The court held that the cows were not eligible for
the exemption because the cattle were not held or bred for
the production of milk and were not held for use by the
debtor’s family.  In re Luckinbill, 163 B.R. 856 (W.D.
Okla. 1994).
HOMESTEAD.  The debtor had lived with the debtor’s
former spouse in a rural homestead until 1981 when the
couple divorced. The debtor moved to an apartment in the
building which also housed the debtor’s used car business.
In 1984 the debtor obtained a mortgage loan from a bank.
The mortgage contained a pre-printed clause stating that the
debtor did not claim any residential or business homestead
in the used car building. In 1987, the debtor had filed
written statements in regard to other loans, stating that the
debtor claimed the rural home as the homestead property.
The debtor sought to avoid the 1984 loan as impairing the
residential and business homestead exemptions on the used
car business building. The court held that the pre-printed
language in the mortgage was not binding because the
lender did not rely on the language in making the loan. In
addition, the court held that the subsequent declarations of
homestead did not affect the 1984 loan, again because the
lender did not rely on them in making the loan. In re
Julian, 163 B.R. 478 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1994).
The debtors’ homestead was sold at a tax foreclosure
sale by the county in violation of the automatic stay.
However, the sale was allowed with the proceeds in excess
of the taxes transferred to the bankruptcy estate. The
debtors claimed their homestead exemption in the proceeds
and the trustee objected, arguing that the sale eliminated all
encumbrances against the property, including the homestead
exemption. The court held that the trustee’s objection was
ineffective because it was not timely filed. In addition, the
court held that the debtors’ homestead exemption rights
continued as to the proceeds of a tax foreclosure sale. In re
Cunningham, 163 B.R. 593 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1994).
PERSONAL PROPERTY. The debtor was a widow
who had farmed with the decedent spouse. At the time of
the bankruptcy filing, the debtor lived alone on the farm and
the children lived elsewhere independent of the debtor. The
debtor claimed the $60,000 personal property exemption for
a family under Tex. Prop. Code § 42.001. A creditor argued
that because the debtor lived alone and had no dependents,
the debtor was eligible for only the single adult exemption
of $30,000. The court held that the debtor’s eligibility for
the “family” exemption arose while the debtor’s spouse was
alive and would continue as to their property after the
spouse died. In re Coffman, 163 B.R. 766 (N.D. Tex.
1994).
   FEDERAL TAXATION    -ALM § 13.03[7].*
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AUTOMATIC STAY. The debtors had filed a Tax
Court appeal of a tax assessment by the IRS. The Tax Court
ruled against the debtors and the debtors filed an appeal.
After the appeal was filed, the debtors filed for bankruptcy
and sought a stay of the Tax Court decision appeal during
the bankruptcy case. The court held that the Tax Court
decision appeal was stayed by the bankruptcy filing. Delpit
v. Comm’r, 94-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,127 (9th Cir.
1994), staying app. from T.C. Memo. 1991-147.
CLAIMS. The debtor sought a determination of the
value of the debtor’s residence for purposes of determining
the amount of the secured portion of a federal tax claim.
The court held that the debtor could deduct the hypothetical
costs of a sale from the fair market value, where the debtor
intended to remain in the residence. In re Coby, 163 B.R.
835 (D. Nev. 1993), rev’g, 154 B.R. 316 (Bankr. D. Nev.
1993), on recon. of, 109 B.R. 963 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1990)..
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY. After the debtor had filed
for Chapter 7 bankruptcy, the debtor sent a check of
bankruptcy estate funds to the IRS in partial payment of
pre-petition taxes. The debtor did not have the authority to
issue the check and the trustee sought return of the funds.
The IRS had not filed a claim in the case and argued that it
was immune from the suit. The court held that because the
IRS accepted the check and presented the check for
payment, the IRS essentially made a claim against funds of
the estate and waived its sovereign immunity against suit
for reclamation of the funds. In re Johnson, 163 B.R. 890
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1993).
TRUSTEE FEES. The IRS had levied against the
debtor’s bank account and life insurance policy prior to the
debtor’s filing for Chapter 13. The debtor’s plan provided
for transfer of the bank account funds and insurance policy
directly to the IRS in partial satisfaction of the IRS secured
tax claim. The trustee objected to the transfer because the
plan did not provide for payment of the trustee’s fees,
arguing that the transfers were subject to the trustee’s fees
because the property transferred was cash or cash
equivalents. The court held that because the property
transferred was identifiable as specific property, the
transfers were not subject to the trustee’s fees. In re Grear,
163 B.R. 524 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1994).
CONTRACTS
BREACH OF WARRANTY.  A farmers’ cooperative
provided herbicide application services for the Chapter 7
debtor’s corn crop and filed a secured claim for the cost of
those services. The debtor counterclaimed against the claim
of the cooperative, alleging that the herbicide was
negligently applied and caused damage to the crop. (See
discussion of negligence claims under Negligence, infra.)
The initial issue was whether the contract for application of
the herbicides was a contract for goods or services. The
court held that the contract was primarily a contract for
goods because the cost of the herbicides was ten times the
costs of application. The court held that the cooperative had
made express warranties as to the herbicide because the
cooperative’s employees advised the debtor as to which
recipe of herbicide to use and how to apply it and the debtor
relied on the superior expertise of the cooperative’s
employees in such matters.  The court also held that the
express warranties were breached in that the herbicide did
not control the weeds. The court also held that the
cooperative breached the implied warranties of
merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose, again
based on the evidence that the herbicide failed to control the
weeds that the herbicide was supposed to control. Although
the court ruled that the cooperative was not negligent in
applying the herbicide, the court held that the combination
of the selection, formulation and application of the
herbicide caused the damage to the debtor’s crops;
therefore, the cooperative was liable for the damages caused
by its breach of the several types of warranty discussed
above.  Matter of L.B. Trucking, Inc., 163 B.R. 709
(Bankr. D. Del. 1994).
FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
BORROWER’S RIGHTS-ALM § 11.01[2].* The
ASCS has adopted as final regulations governing the debt
settlement procedures. The final regulations set policies and
procedures which conform to the Federal Claims Collection
Act and the Federal Claims Collection Standards. 59 Fed.
Reg. 15828 (April 5, 1994).
EGGS. The AMS has issued proposed regulations
clarifying and updating the voluntary shell egg grading
regulations. The amendments include defining washed
ungraded eggs, amending the definition of quality assurance
inspector, upgrading room requirements for mechanized
shell egg operations, and harmonizing with the U.S.
Standards the standards for quality of individual shell eggs
for B quality in U.S. Nest-Run grades. 59 Fed. Reg. 15866
(April 5, 1994).
EMERGENCY LOANS-ALM § 11.01[1].* The FmHA
has adopted as final revisions of the emergency loan
regulations to include crop insurance for eligibility for EM
loans. The revisions also eased the two appraisal
requirements to provide that the appraisals need not be
complete appraisals and removed the requirement that
disaster related assistance and compensation be considered
in assessing eligibility for an EM loan. 59 Fed. Reg. 16771
(April 8, 1994).
GRAIN ELEVATORS. The OSHA has issued a
determination as to housekeeping standards as required by
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. The OSHA had
determined that cleaning procedures had to be implemented
whenever dust reached accumulations of 1/8 inch or more in
priority areas. In the latest determination, OSHA decided
not to extend the 1/8 inch standard to non-priority areas. 59
Fed. Reg. 15339 (April 1, 1994).
MEAT PRODUCTS. The defendant was the quality
control supervisor at a meat packing plant and had taken
meat from barrels marked “inedible” and placed the meat in
barrels marked “edible.” The defendant had pleaded guilty
to violating 21 U.S.C. § 610(a) which prohibits the
adulteration of meat used for human food. The trial court
ruled that the defendant’s violation constituted a felony
under 21 U.S.C. § 676(a) because the defendant’s activities
68                                                                                                                                                                 Agricultural Law Digest
*Agricultural Law Manual (ALM). For information about ordering the Manual, see the last page of this issue.
included the distribution of the meat involved.  The
defendant argued that the term “distribution” was
ambiguous; therefore, the court should apply the lenity
principle and charge the defendant with a misdemeanor
instead of a felony. The court held that under the common
and usual definition of “distribution” the defendant’s
actions constituted distribution because the defendant’s
duties included the selection of meat for specific orders for
customers. United States v. Brummels, 15 F.3d 769 (8th
Cir. 1994).
FEDERAL ESTATE AND
GIFT TAX
DEDUCTIONS-ALM § 5.04.* At the death of the
decedent’s predeceased spouse, the decedent’s two stepsons
challenged the spouse’s will leaving everything to the
decedent. The decedent and the stepsons reached an
agreement under which the decedent was to include in the
decedent’s will a bequest of 40 percent of the estate to the
stepsons. After the decedent’s death, the stepsons filed a
claim against the estate under the agreement for the 40
percent share. The decedent’s executrix agreed to pay the
stepsons their 40 percent and claimed the payment as a
deduction against the taxable estate. The court held that the
payment was not deductible because the only consideration
for the payment was the donative intent of the spouse. Est.
of Huntington v. Comm’r, 16 F.3d 462 (1st Cir. 1994),
aff’g, 100 T.C. 313 (1993).
DISCLAIMERS. In 1956, the decedent transferred title
to stock to the decedent and the taxpayer as joint tenants
with rights of survivorship. The decedent died in 1993 and
the taxpayer filed a written disclaimer of the survivorship
interest in the stock. Ohio law allowed joint tenants to
divide the property, with discretion given to the court to
determine the equitable division of the property,
considering who contributed the property involved. The IRS
ruled that the disclaimer would be effective for one-half of
the value of the stock. Ltr. Rul. 9411014, Dec. 15, 1993.
GENERATION SKIPPING TRANSFER TAX-ALM
§ 5.04[6].*  On the decedent’s death a trust for the
decedent’s surviving spouse and two children became
irrevocable. The trust provided that 20 percent of the
income was to be distributed to the surviving spouse and 80
percent of the income was to be distributed equally to the
two children. The beneficiaries proposed to divide the trust
into two trusts with the surviving spouse to receive 20
percent of the income of each trust and one child to receive
80 percent of one trust and the other child to receive 80
percent of the other trust. A separate independent trustee
would be appointed for the second trust, otherwise all other
terms of the trusts were the same as the original trust. The
IRS ruled that the proposed changes would not cause
recognition of gain from the transfer of trust assets, with the
tax basis and holding periods transferred to the new trusts
and would not subject the trust to GSTT. Ltr. Rul.
9410030, Dec. 10, 1993.
In 1960, the taxpayers, three brothers and a sister,
established two trusts funded with stock in a corporation
wholly-owned by the taxpayers. The final remainder
holders included the lineal descendents of the taxpayers.
The taxpayers discovered that the trusts’ language was
ambiguous in that it was unclear whether the remainder of
the trusts was to be split among the descendants per stirpes
or per capita. The taxpayers planned to ask a state court for
construction of the trusts to rule that the intent of the
grantors was that the remainder be split per stirpes. The IRS
ruled that a state court construction of the trusts would not
result in any gifts of the remainder interests nor would the
construction subject the trusts to GSTT. Ltr. Rul. 9411016,
Dec. 15, 1993.
In 1964, the decedent’s will established a trust for the
decedent’s child with a remainder in trust to the child’s
three children. The decedent’s child also had died and the
trustee proposed to divide the trust into three equal trusts,
one for each beneficiary. Each trust was to receive an equal
undivided interest in some trust property with the remainder
of the property distributed unequally in-kind to give the
beneficiaries more control over trust investments. The IRS
ruled that the proposed changes would not cause
recognition of gain from the transfer of trust assets, would
not result in a taxable gift, and would not subject the trust to
GSTT. Ltr. Rul. 9411033, Dec. 17, 1993.
GIFTS MADE WITHIN THREE YEARS OF
DEATH-ALM § 5.02[3].* The decedent had established a
revocable trust with the decedent as beneficiary. The
decedent retained the power to direct the trustee to pay trust
corpus to the decedent or to other persons. The decedent
made several gifts of stock to the decedent’s children by
directing the trustee to transfer stock in the trust to the
children. The decedent filed gift tax returns for the transfers
and paid gift tax. The IRS included the gifts made within
three years of the decedent’s death, characterizing the gifts
as relinquishments of the decedent’s power to revoke the
trust as to those assets. Following Est. of Jalkut v. Comm’r,
96 T.C. 675 (1991), the court held that the gifts were not
included in the decedent’s estate because the gifts resulted
from the decedent’s exercise of a power to invade the trust
corpus. McNeely v. U.S., 16 F.3d 303 (9th Cir. 1994).
INSTALLMENT PAYMENT OF ESTATE TAX-
ALM § 5.05[1].* The decedent owned farmland which was
used in a family farm operation. The farm was operated by
a partnership of the taxpayer’s son and his sons. The
decedent and the son constructed a farmstand on the
property for the purpose of selling the produce raised on the
farm. In order to obtain a loan to build the farmstand, the
decedent was required to sign a lease for the partnership’s
use of the farmland, the decedent had to grant a security
interest in the farmland for the loan, and the decedent was a
co-obligor on the loan. The decedent and son formed a
corporation to operate the farmstand and the lender required
the decedent to lease the farmstand land to the corporation
on a net lease and required the lease payments to be
assigned as additional security for the farmstand loan. The
decedent did not have an equity interest in either the
partnership or the corporation but received benefits from
both entities, including use of the employees and food
produced on the farm. The decedent and son managed the
farm and farmstand operations and the decedent personally
participated in both operations. The IRS ruled that because
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the decedent actively participated in the farm and farmstand
operations and shared in the profits of the operation on a
non-cash basis, the decedent’s interest in the land involved
was not a passive investment and was eligible for
installment payment of estate tax. Ltr. Rul. 9410011, Dec.
2, 1993.
LOANS WITH BELOW MARKET INTEREST
RATES-ALM § 6.01[1][a].* In 1980, the taxpayers
transferred stock to trusts for the taxpayers’ children in
exchange for promissory notes with 6 percent interest. In
1981, the taxpayers made loans to two of the trusts with no
interest charged. The IRS considered the first transactions
as gifts to the extent the interest rate was less than 11.5
percent and the second transactions as gifts to the extent the
interest rate was less than 12 percent in 1981, 10.6 in 1982
and 8.6 percent in 1983. The taxpayers argued that the test
rate for both transactions was the 6 percent safe harbor rate
of I.R.C. § 483. The court agreed with the holding of
Krabbenhoft v. Comm’r, 939 F.2d 529 (8th Cir. 1991) and
held that I.R.C. § 483 did not apply to valuation of gifts
with interest rates below the market rate. As to the second
transaction, the taxpayers argued that the IRS’s retroactive
application of News Release 84-60 for gifts made before
1984 was improper. The court cited Cohen v. Comm’r, 910
F.2d 422 (7th Cir. 1990) in support of its holding that the
retroactive application of the 1984 method of valuing gifts
made before 1984 was proper in that the method was
consistent with the valuation rules passed by Congress for
gifts after 1984. Schusterman v. U.S., 94-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) ¶ 60,161 (N.D. Okla. 1994).
SPECIAL USE VALUATION-ALM § 5.03[2].* The
taxpayers, two sisters, owned a trust interest in two thirds of
farmland inherited from their parents. The decedent mother
had cash rented the farmland to a corporation owned by the
parents and the children. The decedent mother’s estate had
elected special use valuation for the farmland and the IRS
had approved the election. The IRS argued that it had
allowed the election under the amendments to I.R.C. §
2032A(b)(1), (b)(5) which allowed special use valuation for
land cash rented by a surviving spouse to a family member.
The court held that those amendments could not apply
because the land was cash rented to a corporation. Instead,
the court ruled that the special use valuation election was
allowed under Treas. Reg. § 20.2032A-3(b)(1) because the
corporation had fewer than 15 shareholders. The court also
held that the regulation also applied for determining
whether a similar lease arrangement was a qualified use by
the heirs through their beneficial interests in the trust. The
court reasoned that because the heirs also owned stock in
the corporation, the heirs had the requisite financial risk in
the operation of the farm. Note: The case should be read
very carefully. It is important to note that each qualified heir
must meet the qualified use test. Query whether the two
sisters were “at risk” in light of their small percentage of
corporate stock ownership. This case will be discussed in an
upcoming issue of the Digest.  Minter v. U.S., 94-1 U.S.
Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,160 (8th Cir. 1994).
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
ACCOUNTING METHODS. The IRS has issued
procedures for changing the accounting method  to comply
with the regulations governing original issue discounts. The
procedures apply only for taxable years that end on or after
December 22, 1992, or begin on or before April 4, 1994.
Rev. Proc. 94-28, I.R.B. 1994-16.  For loans acquired
before December 22, 1992, the procedures are given in Rev.
Proc. 94-30, I.R.B. 1994-16.
The IRS has also issued procedures for use of the price
reduction method of accounting for de minimis original
issue discount on certain loans originated by the taxpayer.
The procedures are effective for taxable years beginning
after April 4, 1994. Rev. Proc. 94-29, I.R.B. 1994-16.
BUSINESS EXPENSE-ALM § 4.03 .* An elementary
school teacher was denied deductions relating to a computer
because the taxpayer failed to demonstrate that the
computer was purchased for the convenience of the
taxpayer’s employer or that the computer was necessary for
performance of the taxpayer’s duties. Bryant v. Comm’r,
T.C. Memo. 1993-597.
COURT AWARDS AND SETTLEMENTS-ALM §
4.02[14].* The payments received by the taxpayer in
settlement of an age discrimination suit under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act were excludible from
the taxpayer’s gross income because the Act provided a
tort-like action for back pay, liquidated damages and a right
to a jury trial. Bennett v. U.S., 94-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH)
¶ 50,044 (Fed. Cl. 1994).
The taxpayer sued a former employer for wrongful
discharge, breach of contract and violation of RICO. After
the jury found that the discharge was improper, the taxpayer
and employer negotiated a settlement which allocated a
portion of the payment to the wrongful discharge claim. The
court held that the taxpayer would be allowed to exclude the
payments for wrongful discharge based on the settlement
allocation because the settlement was reached by arm’s
length negotiations by adverse parties. McKay v. Comm’r,
102 T.C.  No. 16 (1994).
DEPRECIATION-ALM § 4.03[4].* The taxpayer
purchased a two-year-old standardbred racehorse for cash
and  a promissory note and claimed depreciation on the
horse for the total sales price. The court held that the
taxpayer’s depreciation was limited to the cash investment
because the taxpayer failed to prove that the promissory
note was valid indebtedness and that the purchase price was
not artificially inflated. The taxpayer was allowed to
depreciate the horse over three years. Mulderig v.
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1994-123.
HOBBY LOSSES-ALM § 4.05[1].* The taxpayer was
allowed business deductions relating to a commercial
fishing activity because the taxpayer operated the business
with an intent to make a profit, as evidenced by the
taxpayer’s expertise and the amount of danger involved in
the activity. Briggs v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1994-125.
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INVESTMENT TAX CREDIT-ALM § 4.03[12].* The
taxpayer was employed as a professor at a university. The
taxpayer claimed investment tax credit for an automobile
used for commuting to work, a computer used at home for
research and an answering machine. The court held that the
investment tax credit was not allowed because the property
was not used in a trade or business. Tseng v. Comm’r,
T.C. Memo. 1994-126.
A limited partnership was not allowed investment tax
credit for leased property because the expenses associated
with the property did not exceed 15 percent of the rental
income from the property. The partnership was not allowed
to include in those expenses, payments which would be
reimbursed by the lessee. Doctors Hospital Real Estate,
Ltd. v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1994-143.
LIFE INSURANCE.  The taxpayer acquired a life
insurance policy under a split-dollar agreement with the
taxpayer’s employer. Under the agreement, (1) the
employer loaned the taxpayer the amount of the premiums,
(2) the taxpayer paid the premiums and assigned the policy
to the employer as collateral for the loans, and (3) upon the
taxpayer’s death, the employer received the proceeds equal
to the amount of the loan, with the taxpayer’s spouse
receiving any remaining proceeds. The taxpayer sought to
value the economic benefit of the agreement by using tables
supplied by the insurance company which resulted in a
lower valuation than the table provided by the IRS. The
court held that the insurance company tables could be used
because the tables met the requirement that the tables be
available for all standard risk insurance policies. Healy v.
U.S., 843 F. Supp. 562 (D. S.D. 1994).
The taxpayer was a general partnership which purchased
a life insurance policy on the life of its managing director
who was not a partner. The taxpayer was the beneficiary of
the policy. The taxpayer sought a ruling that the retirement
of existing partners and the joining of new partners would
not disqualify the partnership from the excluding the life
insurance proceeds from income under I.R.C. § 101(a)(1)
because the new partners would be seen as purchasing a
portion of the policy. The IRS ruled that the admission of
new partners or withdrawal of existing partners would not
result in transfer of the the life insurance policy because the
partnership would be considered as continuing through
these transactions. Ltr. Rul. 9410039, Dec. 14, 1993.
LOSSES-ALM § 4.05[1].*  The taxpayer was the sole
shareholder of a corporation which operated a car
dealership. In each of several taxable years, the taxpayer
sold corporation stock at a loss to an employee. The
taxpayer transferred the shares to the corporation which
issued new stock to the employee. The taxpayer claimed the
losses as ordinary losses but the losses were denied by the
IRS as not related to a trade or business. The taxpayer
argued that the sale of stock had a business purpose in that
the sales were incentives for the employee to remain with
the business. The court held that the losses were not
deductible as business losses because the only business
involved was the car dealership and that was the
corporation’s business. In addition, the court held that the
stock sales were not entered into with a profit motive but
were made primarily for the tax benefits. Robinson v. U.S.,
94-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,134 (D. Minn. 1994).
MORTGAGE POINTS. The IRS has announced that
home mortgage points paid by the sellers are deductible by
the buyers. The amount of the point payments by the sellers
is to be deducted from the sales price of the home. The new
rules are effective for tax years beginning after   December
   31, 1990   . Procedures for filing amended returns is included.
Rev. Proc. 94-27, I.R.B. 1994-15.
PARTNERSHIPS-ALM § 7.03.*
ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUSTMENTS. A partner
holding less than 1 percent interest in partnership profits
was not allowed to file a petition for review of a Final
Partnership Administrative Adjustment within 150 days
after the FPAA. Government Arbitrage Trading Co. v.
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1994-136.
DEFINITION. The taxpayer partnership had two general
partners, an individual and an S corporation and was formed
under a law which conformed to the Uniform Limited
Partnership Act. The individual decided to retire from the
partnership and the corporation notified all limited partners
of its intent to continue the partnership. The partnership
agreement required all general partners to hold at least a 1
percent interest in all partnership income, loss, deductions
and credits. The agreement was amended to require that
upon termination of the partnership all general partners are
to contribute to the partnership the lesser of (1) any deficit
balance in a capital account or (2) the excess of 1.01 percent
of the total capital contributions of the limited partners over
the capital contributed by the general partners. Limited
partners could not transfer their partnership interests
without the consent of the general partner. New general
partners had to be elected by a majority of the limited
partners. The IRS ruled that the partnership was taxable as a
partnership for federal tax purposes. Ltr. Rul. 9411012,
Dec. 14, 1993.
PENSION PLANS. For plans beginning in March
1994, the weighted average is 7.33 percent with the
permissible range of 6.60 to 8.06 percent for purposes of
determining the full funding limitation under I.R.C. §
412(c)(7).  Notice 94-26, I.R.B. 1994-13, 20.
THEFT LOSSES-ALM § 4.05[1].* A corporation was
not allowed a deduction for theft losses due to a
bookkeeper’s embezzlement because the corporation failed
to prove the embezzlement under state law. Ollis Bros.,
Inc. v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1994-121.
TRAVEL EXPENSES. Citing Walker v. Comm’r, 101
T.C. No. 36 (1993), the court held that a woodcutter was
allowed deductions for expenses relating to traveling to the
various worksites because the taxpayer's home office was
the taxpayer’s principal place of business. Burleson v.
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1994-130.
LANDLORD AND TENANT
CONSERVATION RESERVE PROGRAM. The
plaintiffs leased farmland under a year to year holdover
lease from the defendants who leased the land from other
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owners. The defendants decided to enroll the land in the
federal Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) and the
plaintiffs agreed. The plaintiffs provided services and
materials for weeding and maintaining the CRP acres for
one year. After the defendants threatened to evict the
plaintiffs if the plaintiffs did not sign a five year lease of the
CRP acres, the plaintiff brought an action to declare that the
plaintiff had the right to possession of the CRP acres for the
term of the CRP contract. The court acknowledged that the
CRP contract required evidence that the operator would
have possession for the term of the contract but no evidence
of this was in the record. The court held that the CRP
contract did not give rise to a contractual requirement that
the plaintiffs have possession of the CRP acres during the
contract. Indeed, the court noted that the CRP contract also
provided for the change of possession during the contract.
Note: The court did not allow appeal on the issue of quasi-
estoppel because the plaintiffs did not specifically plead the
issue at the trial level, although the Court of Appeals had
ruled for the plaintiffs based on that issue. Schiewe v.
Farwell, 867 P.2d 920 (Idaho 1993).
NEGLIGENCE
HERBICIDES-ALM § 1.01 .* A farmer’s cooperative
provided herbicide application services for the Chapter 7
debtor’s corn crop and filed a secured claim for the cost of
those services. The debtor counterclaimed against the claim
of the cooperative, alleging that the herbicide was
negligently applied and caused damage to the crop. The
court held that although the debtor demonstrated that the
herbicide was not applied in conformity with recognized
standards, the debtor failed to demonstrate that the
misapplication caused the damage involved. The evidence
showed that the damage was uniform and that some aspects
of the application method were within industry standards.
Matter of L.B. Trucking, Inc., 163 B.R. 709 (Bankr. D.
Del. 1994).
PRODUCTS LIABILITY
GRAIN AUGER-ALM § 1.01[1].* The plaintiff was an
employee of the defendant who owned a grain farm. The
plaintiff was injured while operating a grain auger
manufactured by a co-defendant and installed by another
co-defendant. The plaintiff sued in strict liability and
negligence, claiming that the auger covers were unsafe and
that the auger had insufficient warnings as to operating the
auger without the covers. The covers were modified by the
owner and installer for easier removal in case of jamming of
grain. The modifications also caused the covers to more
often come off when pushed by grain buildup in the auger.
The plaintiff was injured while attempting to move the
auger after all the covers were removed for easier grain
loading. The trial court had granted summary judgment for
the defendant manufacturer, holding that the injury was
caused by the modifications of the auger covers. The
appellate court reversed, holding that because products
liability in Idaho was a comparative fault, a jury question
remained as to whether the covers were negligently
designed  so as to contribute to the plaintiff’s injuries. In
addition, the court held that a jury question remained as to
whether the auger had sufficient warnings as to the dangers
of operating the auger without the covers so as to contribute
to the cause of the plaintiff’s injuries. Tuttle v. Sudenga
Industries, Inc., 868 P.2d 473 (Idaho 1994).
STATE REGULATION OF
AGRICULTURE
EXHAUSTION OF REMEDIES. The plaintiff was a
bank which had a security interest in the accounts
receivable of a failed grain elevator. The Illinois
Department of Agriculture, Bureau of Warehouses
(IDABW) had suspended the elevator’s license. At a
meeting with the IDABW, the bank asserted its priority
security interest in the elevator’s grain but the bureau chief
of the IDABW claimed a superior statutory lien in the grain
under Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 127, ¶ 40.23. The bank did not file
an administrative appeal but filed a state court action in
which the court ruled that the bank’s security interest was
superior to the IDABW statutory lien. On appeal the
IDABW argued that the action was barred because the bank
failed to exhaust its administrative remedies. The court
stated that although any administrative ruling by the
IDABW would likely be supportive of the bureau chief’s
assertions, this fact alone did not relieve the bank from
pursuing at least some administrative appeal before
resorting to the courts. Union Bank v. Blackstone
Sunbury-Nevada Grain Co., Inc., 627 N.E.2d 385 (Ill.
Ct. App. 1993).
STATE TAXATION
AGRICULTURAL USE-ALM § 13.06[2].* The
taxpayer exchanged forest land for forest land owned by the
United States Forest Service. The previously owned land
was eligible for use valuation as agricultural use land but
the Forest Service property was exempt from taxation.
Under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 105-277.3(c), land was eligible for
use valuation if at the time title to the property passed to the
taxpayer, the property was eligible for use valuation and the
taxpayer owned other property eligible for use valuation.
The state argued that the conditions were not met because
the property in the hands of the Forest Service was not
eligible for use valuation. The court held that the time for
determining whether the property was eligible for use
valuation was immediately after transfer of title to the
taxpayer; therefore, the property was eligible for use
valuation. Appeal of Davis, 440 S.E.2d 307 (N.C. Ct. App.
1994).
ZONING
AGRICULTURAL USE. The defendant owned
property zoned as a shoreland conservatory district. The
defendant used the land as a trout farm in which customers
would fish in the ponds for trout and the defendant would
offer to clean the fish caught. The defendant also sold fish
directly to customers. The defendant argued that the trout
farm was a permitted agricultural use of the land. The court
held that while the growing of fish in the ponds was an
acceptable use, the operation of a public fishing area and
retail fish business was not permitted under the zoning
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ordinance. County of Adams v. Romeo, 510 N.W.2d 693
(Wis. Ct. App. 1993).
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The plaintiff owned land designated as forest land. The
plaintiff used a portion of the land as a Christmas tree farm.
The plaintiff wanted to use additional portions of the land
for the Christmas tree business but needed to level a hill in
order to make use of the land. The plaintiff proposed
removing 300,000 to 400,000 cubic yards of soil from the
area, using a portion of the soil to restore a cranberry bog
and retaining the top soil for cultivation of the trees to be
planted in the leveled area. The zoning for the land allowed
agricultural uses but prohibited removing “significant
amounts of earth.” The town denied the plaintiff’s
application to level the hill, stating that the soil removal
violated the zoning ordinance. The court held that the
leveling of the hill and soil removal was incidental to the
agricultural use and was, therefore, a permitted agricultural
use of the land. Henry v. Bd. of Appeals of Dunstable,
627 N.E.2d 484 (Mass. Ct. App. 1994).
CITATION UPDATES
Est. of O’Daniel v. U.S., 6 F.3d 321 (5th Cir. 1993)
(life insurance) see p. 5, supra.
AGRICULTURAL LAW MANUAL
by Neil E. Harl
This comprehensive, annotated looseleaf manual is an
ideal deskbook for attorneys, tax consultants, lenders and
other professionals who advise agricultural clients. The
book contains over 900 pages and an index.
As a special offer to Digest subscribers, the Manual is
offered to new subscribers at $115, including at no extra
charge updates published within five months after
purchase. Updates are published every four months to keep
the Manual current with the latest developments. After the
first free update, additional updates will be billed at $35
each in 1994.
For your copy, send a check for $115 (WI residents add
$5.75 sales tax) to Agricultural Law Press, P.O. Box 5444,
Madison, WI 53705.
Satisfaction guaranteed. 30 day return privilege.
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